Routes used to stop running Metasploit tasks (either particular ones or all tasks) allowed GET requests. Only POST requests should have been allowed, as the stop/stop_all routes change the state of the service. This could have allowed an attacker to stop currently-running Metasploit tasks by getting an authenticated user to execute JavaScript. As of Metasploit 4.14.0 (Update 2017061301), the routes for stopping tasks only allow POST requests, which validate the presence of a secret token to prevent CSRF attacks.
This vulnerability carries a LOW severity rating with a CVSS v3.1 score of 3.5, indicating it can be exploited remotely over the network with relatively low complexity though user interaction is required requiring only low-level privileges . The vulnerability impacts and limited availability for affected systems. Impacting 1 product from rapid7 organizations running these solutions should prioritize assessment and patching.
First disclosed in 2017, this vulnerability was reported during a period defined by widespread IoT adoption challenges, mobile security concerns, and the emergence of advanced persistent threat (APT) techniques. Contemporary mitigation strategies focused on secure development practices and third-party component vetting.
2017-06-15T14:29:00.213
2026-05-13T00:24:29.033
Modified
CVSSv3.0: 3.5 (LOW)
AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P
6.8
2.9
| Type | Vendor | Product | Version/Range | Vulnerable? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application | rapid7 | metasploit | ≤ 4.13.19 | Yes |
SecUtils normalizes and enriches National Vulnerability Database (NVD) records by standardizing vendor and product identifiers, aggregating vulnerability metadata from both NVD and MITRE sources, and providing structured context for security teams. For rapid7's affected products, we extract Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) data, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classifications, CVSS severity metrics, and reference data to enable rapid vulnerability prioritization and asset correlation. This record contains no exploit code, proof-of-concept instructions, or attack methodologies—only defensive intelligence necessary for patch management, risk assessment, and security operations.