TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
2021-09-20T20:15:11.337
2024-11-21T05:07:11.853
Modified
CVSSv3.1: 6.8 (MEDIUM)
AV:A/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N
5.5
4.9
Type | Vendor | Product | Version/Range | Vulnerable? |
---|---|---|---|---|
Application | ti | 15.4-stack | - | Yes |
Application | ti | ble5-stack | - | Yes |
Application | ti | dynamic_multi-protocal_manager | - | Yes |
Application | ti | easylink | - | Yes |
Application | ti | openthread | - | Yes |
Application | ti | z-stack | - | Yes |
Operating System | ti | real-time_operating_system | - | Yes |