Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used, `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`.
This vulnerability carries a MEDIUM severity rating with a CVSS v3.1 score of 5.9, indicating it can be exploited remotely over the network but requires specific conditions to be met without requiring user interaction and does not require pre-existing privileges . The vulnerability impacts integrity (unauthorized modifications), for affected systems. Impacting 8 products from netty, from netapp, from netapp and 5 others, organizations running these solutions should prioritize assessment and patching.
Reported in 2021, this vulnerability emerged during an era marked by increased sophistication in supply chain attacks, cloud infrastructure vulnerabilities, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) security challenges. Security practices during this period emphasized zero-trust architectures, container security, and API protection.
2021-03-09T19:15:12.657
2024-11-21T05:47:57.530
Modified
CVSSv3.1: 5.9 (MEDIUM)
AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N
4.9
2.9
| Type | Vendor | Product | Version/Range | Vulnerable? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application | netty | netty | < 4.1.60 | Yes |
| Application | netapp | oncommand_api_services | - | Yes |
| Application | netapp | oncommand_workflow_automation | - | Yes |
| Operating System | debian | debian_linux | 10.0 | Yes |
| Application | quarkus | quarkus | ≤ 1.13.7 | Yes |
| Application | apache | kudu | < 1.16.0 | Yes |
| Application | apache | zookeeper | 3.5.9 | Yes |
| Application | oracle | communications_cloud_native_core_policy | 1.14.0 | Yes |
SecUtils normalizes and enriches National Vulnerability Database (NVD) records by standardizing vendor and product identifiers, aggregating vulnerability metadata from both NVD and MITRE sources, and providing structured context for security teams. For netty's affected products, we extract Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) data, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classifications, CVSS severity metrics, and reference data to enable rapid vulnerability prioritization and asset correlation. This record contains no exploit code, proof-of-concept instructions, or attack methodologies—only defensive intelligence necessary for patch management, risk assessment, and security operations.