The npm package "tar" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created. This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/` characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16, 5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc.
This vulnerability carries a HIGH severity rating with a CVSS v3.1 score of 8.2, requiring local system access to exploit with relatively low complexity though user interaction is required and does not require pre-existing privileges . The vulnerability impacts confidentiality (data exposure), integrity (unauthorized modifications), for affected systems. Impacting 4 products from npmjs, from debian, from oracle and 1 other, organizations running these solutions should prioritize assessment and patching.
Reported in 2021, this vulnerability emerged during an era marked by increased sophistication in supply chain attacks, cloud infrastructure vulnerabilities, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) security challenges. Security practices during this period emphasized zero-trust architectures, container security, and API protection.
2021-08-31T17:15:07.963
2024-11-21T06:15:44.403
Modified
CVSSv3.1: 8.2 (HIGH)
AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
3.4
6.4
| Type | Vendor | Product | Version/Range | Vulnerable? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application | npmjs | tar | < 4.4.16 | Yes |
| Application | npmjs | tar | < 5.0.8 | Yes |
| Application | npmjs | tar | < 6.1.7 | Yes |
| Operating System | debian | debian_linux | 10.0 | Yes |
| Operating System | debian | debian_linux | 11.0 | Yes |
| Application | oracle | graalvm | 20.3.3 | Yes |
| Application | oracle | graalvm | 21.2.0 | Yes |
| Application | siemens | sinec_infrastructure_network_services | < 1.0.1.1 | Yes |
SecUtils normalizes and enriches National Vulnerability Database (NVD) records by standardizing vendor and product identifiers, aggregating vulnerability metadata from both NVD and MITRE sources, and providing structured context for security teams. For npmjs's affected products, we extract Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) data, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classifications, CVSS severity metrics, and reference data to enable rapid vulnerability prioritization and asset correlation. This record contains no exploit code, proof-of-concept instructions, or attack methodologies—only defensive intelligence necessary for patch management, risk assessment, and security operations.