The AWS IoT Device SDK v2 for Java, Python, C++ and Node.js appends a user supplied Certificate Authority (CA) to the root CAs instead of overriding it on macOS systems. Additionally, SNI validation is also not enabled when the CA has been “overridden”. TLS handshakes will thus succeed if the peer can be verified either from the user-supplied CA or the system’s default trust-store. Attackers with access to a host’s trust stores or are able to compromise a certificate authority already in the host's trust store (note: the attacker must also be able to spoof DNS in this case) may be able to use this issue to bypass CA pinning. An attacker could then spoof the MQTT broker, and either drop traffic and/or respond with the attacker's data, but they would not be able to forward this data on to the MQTT broker because the attacker would still need the user's private keys to authenticate against the MQTT broker. The 'aws_tls_ctx_options_override_default_trust_store_*' function within the aws-c-io submodule has been updated to address this behavior. This issue affects: Amazon Web Services AWS IoT Device SDK v2 for Java versions prior to 1.5.0 on macOS. Amazon Web Services AWS IoT Device SDK v2 for Python versions prior to 1.7.0 on macOS. Amazon Web Services AWS IoT Device SDK v2 for C++ versions prior to 1.14.0 on macOS. Amazon Web Services AWS IoT Device SDK v2 for Node.js versions prior to 1.6.0 on macOS. Amazon Web Services AWS-C-IO 0.10.7 on macOS.
This vulnerability carries a MEDIUM severity rating with a CVSS v3.1 score of 6.3, indicating it requires adjacent network access but requires specific conditions to be met though user interaction is required . The vulnerability impacts confidentiality (data exposure), integrity (unauthorized modifications), and availability (service disruption) for affected systems. Impacting 3 products from amazon, from amazon, from apple organizations running these solutions should prioritize assessment and patching.
Reported in 2021, this vulnerability emerged during an era marked by increased sophistication in supply chain attacks, cloud infrastructure vulnerabilities, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) security challenges. Security practices during this period emphasized zero-trust architectures, container security, and API protection.
2021-11-23T00:15:07.437
2024-11-21T06:24:52.353
Modified
CVSSv3.1: 6.3 (MEDIUM)
AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P
6.8
6.4
| Type | Vendor | Product | Version/Range | Vulnerable? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application | amazon | amazon_web_services_aws-c-io | 0.10.7 | Yes |
| Application | amazon | amazon_web_services_internet_of_things_device_software_development_kit_v2 | < 1.5.0 | Yes |
| Application | amazon | amazon_web_services_internet_of_things_device_software_development_kit_v2 | < 1.6.0 | Yes |
| Application | amazon | amazon_web_services_internet_of_things_device_software_development_kit_v2 | < 1.7.0 | Yes |
| Application | amazon | amazon_web_services_internet_of_things_device_software_development_kit_v2 | < 1.14.0 | Yes |
| Operating System | apple | macos | - | No |
SecUtils normalizes and enriches National Vulnerability Database (NVD) records by standardizing vendor and product identifiers, aggregating vulnerability metadata from both NVD and MITRE sources, and providing structured context for security teams. For amazon's affected products, we extract Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) data, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classifications, CVSS severity metrics, and reference data to enable rapid vulnerability prioritization and asset correlation. This record contains no exploit code, proof-of-concept instructions, or attack methodologies—only defensive intelligence necessary for patch management, risk assessment, and security operations.